- Used for [[Review of The Tyrants of Syracuse by Jeff Champion]] -- that's a much better resource because it's got the headings. ## Highlights ### Page 23 > Aristodemus 'was not ignorant of the purpose of his enemies' and returned secretly to Cumae. He and his followers took power by storming the council building and killing many of the aristoi. He then introduced a number of measures in favour of the poor, including the two policies that were anathema to the wealthy classes of ancient Greece. 'He established two institutions which are the worst of all human institutions and the prologues to every tyranny-a redistribution of the land and an abolition of debts.' Aristodemus then promised that he should be 'appointed general with absolute power till the public tranquility should be secured and they had established a democratic constitution.' He then carried out a brutal purge of the aristocracy. > Despite his promises to the people, he then continued to rule as tyrant, supported by non-Greek mercenaries and a bodyguard of 'the filthiest and the most unprincipled of the citizens'. Fourteen years later he was overthrown by the surviving aristocrats, who had been living in exile in Capua. They murdered Aristodemus, all his family and supporters. The nobles then 'restored the traditional government.' - [n] This reminds me of Fight Club; this would be useful for creating a article about why classical wisdom gives us hints of what would happen if the premise of fight club ever really happened. (Page 23) ### Page 28 > The Greek survivors of the battle collected their families and abandoned Alalia, fleeing to Rhegium. Those captured by the Etruscans were stoned to death as a punishment for their piracy, The victors divided the spoils, with the Etruscans annexing Corsica and the Carthaginians claiming Sardinia. > > The Sardinians, however, put up strong resistance and defeated the Punic expedition in a battle, inflicting heavy losses on the invaders. The Carthaginians, who would show a penchant for punishing failed commanders, exiled both Malchus and his army. This force, unlike those the Carthaginians would later use once they had built their empire, appears to have consisted mostly of Carthaginian citizens. Hearing of their exile, they rebelled and sailed back to Carthage, claiming that 'they were not come to overthrow, but to recover their country; and that they would show their countrymen that it was not valour, but fortune, that had failed them in the preceding war." Malchus succeeded in taking Carthage, supposedly after crucifying his own son for siding with the city against him. He executed ten of his leading opponents but then refused to seize power as a tyrant. As well as being vindictive towards failed commanders, the people of Carthage were also suspicious of ambitious generals. They accused Malchus of plotting a coup and executed him. - [n] Relevant to Carthage culture. this might also be useful as a lessons from the classic world thing about the value of not punishing competent commanders just because they failed, and how difficult it is to separate out failure due to incompetence and failure to circumstance. (Page 28) ### Page 29 > In 505 Cleander had seized power in the city of Gela. In common with most other earlier tyrants he probably took measures to curb or break the power of the aristocracy, but this can only be supposition. Aristotle claims that he overthrew an oligarchy, but this may mean the aristocracy as Aristotle sometimes uses the terms interchangeably. - [n] There's something to be said for viewing oligarchy and aristocracy as interchangeable in any society that has inheritance of wealth. Lessons from classical wisdom can teach us something about the dangers of having a wealthy oligarchy from political perspective, and the inherentions between the poor and the wealthy and a democratic world. (Page 29) ### Page 40 > Gelon forced-marched his army across the island to Himera. His rapid arrival revived the morale of the Himerians. He built his camp close to the city and fortified it with a wall and deep trench. Not expecting the rapid arrival of the Syracusans, the Carthaginians had sent out much of their army to forage all around the countryside. Gelon ordered his cavalry to attack the dispersed Carthaginians. The loss of the Carthaginian horses now proved decisive, for without the protection of their own cavalry the Carthaginian foragers were almost defenceless against the rampaging Greek cavalry. The Greek horsemen easily overcame the foragers, capturing 10,000 prisoners. > After taking the Carthaginians captive, Gelon undertook a stratagem that was common in the ancient world when troops faced a strange enemy for the first Stime. He 'stripped all the feeblest, especially from among the auxiliaries, who * were very swarthy, and exhibited them nude before the eyes 00 order to convince his men that their foes were contemptible."5 This, along with the success of the cavalry enhanced the authority of Gelon and, supposedly, caused the Greeks to no longer fear the Carthaginians but instead to treat them with disdain. - [n] This is a good explanation of how Calvary screens work. (Page 40) ### Page 41 > At sunrise the Carthaginian guards allowed the Greek cavalry into the camp. Another stroke of luck then befell the Greeks as that day was a Punic festival and they found Hamilcar preparing to sacrifice to the god of the sea. Finding him unprepared for battle, the horsemen immediately charged the Carthaginian commander and killed him. They then set about firing the ships as ordered. Herodotus records a more dramatic version of Hamilcar's death, claiming that when: > His army was routed, he leapt into the flames, and was burnt to nothing. But whatever explanation we adopt of his disappearance, the fact remains that he is treated with divine honours and monuments were erected to him in all the Carthaginian colonies in addition to the one -d the most splendid of all – in Carthage itself. - [n] This is a useful resource for a blog post idea about changing concepts of deity. could be useful to analogize to modern wisdom, classic wisdom, by comparing this deification with the sorts of ways that our celebrities get treated if they die in a tragic way, like princess Diana or James Dean or Heath ledger. (Page 41) ### Page 44 > All the Greek cities appear to have used their newly won wealth in the construction of temples and public works. The city of Akragas benefited in that many of the fugitives from the battle fled south and were captured in their territory. There was supposedly so many that some private citizens captured 500 each. The Akragantians also set them to work, building 'not only the the largest temples to the gods... but also the underground conduits were built to lead off the waters from the city; these are so large that their construction is well worth seeing. The ruins of these temples are still able to be visited today, and, as apparently was also the case in Diodorus' time, are one of Sicily's major tourist attractions. - [n] We are really good explanations of what sorts of purposes Greek slaves were put toward, this is a good explanation of the sorts of Labor that people captured in war might have been expected to do. It's also relevant to ancient infrastructure. (Page 44) ### Page 59 > The Greeks of Asia and the Aegean islands, usually referred to as the Ionians, now looked to Athens for support. In 477 they rejected the appointment of a new Spartan commander. The Spartans now withdrew from the war, leaving the Athenians in control. Along with the Ionian Greeks the Athenians formed a new alliance, the Delian League, with its treasury in the temple of Apollo on the island of Delos. The stated purpose of the League was to liberate the Greek cities from Persian control. With the victory of the League at the Battle of the Eurymedon River (Aspendos in southern Turkey) > in 469, Persian power in the region was smashed. - [n] The showcase is another job for the priests; temples were used as Banks. (Page 59) ### Page 64 > On normal duties an Athenian trireme carried four archers and ten marines. A trireme could, however, carry up to forty marines. For a largescale expedition such as this it is most likely that a larger complement than usual would have been carried in order to provide a reasonably sized force of heavy infantry. Marines were armed as hoplites, but usually less heavily armoured. On board ship they would substitute their spear for javelins. > > Athenian marines were usually drawn from the lowest property class and their equipment, probably just a shield, spear and javelins, was provided by the state. A trireme's normal complement was 180 rowers and about a dozen sailors. If necessary the naval crew could also fight, usually as poorly-armed skirmishers, armed with a dagger and possibly a javelin, or sometimes by simply throwing rocks. - [n] Really interesting for making a chart about how many people would have been involved on a trireme; compare against the numbers in the seafaring book. (Page 64) ### Page 74 > After the death of Cleon, the two dominant Athenian politicians were hi opponent Nicias and Alcibiades. Nicias was the older of the two, being born about 470, Unlike Alcibiades he was not an aristocrat; instead, his family was newly rich. He made most of his money by owning more than 1,000 slaves and hiring them out to the state-owned silver mines. This was a particularly vicious form of earning income as conditions in the mines were brutal and the life expectancy of the slaves was short. In common with other rich men, Nicias spent his money conspicuously to gain the favour of the masses. He sponsored religious processions and theatre performances. Like many others who did the same, he became popular and was elected to important state offices. - [n] This is a useful explanation of how powerful people in ancient times gained power, contrast with the modern method of just outright advertising, which is in its own way sponsoring the theater performances. After all these advertisements go towards paying for things like television shows, we just don't think of it that way in modern times. But fundamentally putting a political advertisement into the super bowl is sponsoring the super bowl. (Page 74) ### Page 82 > Lamachus' strategy was considered by Thucydides, another Athenis general, Demosthenes, and most modern commentators to be the best oprion He lacked, however, the prestige of the other two commanders, being far les wealthy, less well-born and a political nonentity. Neither of the other two would support such a risky plan. Lamachus then broke the deadlock by supporting Alcibiades' scheme rather the do-nothing strategy of Nicias. This plan was, however, clearly self-serving on Alcibiades' part. It would rely heavily on his skills as a negotiator and provide him with a network of allies throughout Sicily. Once he had built his own power base in this way he could then embark on his more ambitious plans of conquest. - [n] Experience soldier gets ignored by wealthy man who bought his commission is a tale as Old as Time. You'd would think we would have learned from it. But despite how often this trope appears in fiction, Reddit is still filled with stories of incompetent officers who didn't listen to their more experienced underlings. (Page 82) ### Page 85 > Meanwhile, in Athens, Alcibiades' fears had been realized. Charges of impiety had been brought against him. When the fleet returned to Catane it found the official trireme of Athens, the Salaminia, waiting. They had a summons for Alcibiades, and others, to return to Athens and stand trial. The delegation had, however, been ordered to conduct the arrest quietly so as not to alarm their own troops and particularly the allies, many of whom had close ties to Alcibiades. He was allowed to return in his own ship, sailing alongside the Salaminia. > The unsecured Alcibiades used the opportunity to escape at Thurii. He was unwilling to trust in Athenian justice, claiming 'in the matter of life I wouldn't trust even my own mother not to mistake a black for a white ballot when she cast her vote.' Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed from Thurii to the Peloponnesus. The Athenian assembly condemned him and his companions to death. Hearing this he threatened to 'show them . . . that I'm allve. > Alcibiades soon deserted to the Spartans and gave them advice on how to bring 'ruin and destruction to his native city." His first act of betrayal was to denounce the Athenian sympathizers in Messene. It is little wonder that the Athenian demos never fully trusted him, nor other Greek democracies their own aristocrats. Their inflated egos and sense of self-importance tended to be more important to them than any sense of patriotism! - [n] Try this absolutely baffling. He didn't betray them until they were planning to execute him what trumped up political charges. The author is saying that it's unpatriotic to flee for people who are going to kill you and stop supporting them. This seems to be a plague that Socrates method of suicide is the only acceptable answer, which memorial perspective is bizarre to me, but maybe I'm missing some sort of context about Greek history that would clarify this statement? (Page 85) ### Page 101 > The Athenians were reminding both Gylippus and the Syracusans of their earlier triumph over the supposedly invincible Spartans at Pylos. They were also mocking the archaic habit of the Spartans of growing their hair long. This attitude was also shared by some of the Syracusans themselves, as the historian Timaeus claims 'that the Sicilians also made no account of Gylippus... as soon as they set eyes upon him they jeered at his cloak and his long hair'. 1 These jibes may also have had a political basis as long hair was often associated with the aristocracy.? Many of the anti-democratic rich in Athens emulated the Spartans by growing their hair and/or beards long, and wearing their short, red military cloaks. - [n] Aarons have been using visual signaling to declare their allegiance socially for thousands of years. The idea of not judging a book by its cover is stupid. You can tell not just what somebody's social class, but their political allegiance is, based on what they wear and how they style themselves. The ancients knew this, and so do we. High School Goths in black, the jocks with their long socks up to their knees, nerds with their witty t-shirts. (Page 101) ### Page 103 > Water and food were scarce and those sent out to forage came under constant attack from a large squadron of Syracusan cavalry stationed at the Temple of Zeus. According to Thucydides these horsemen were 'masters of the country, a third part of the enemy's cavalry neral from a state e easily blockade the mouth of the harbour. He built three icias, a proponent needed 'to defend tions of Sparta." > enus' stratagems. > crats, refused to ave betrayed one or the breach of n historians, its fleet could more belleursions on the part of the Athenians." Nicias, having learnt from his ing o intercept Gylippus, also sent off a squadron of twenty ships to Italy falacept a Corinthian fleet that had been reported as on its way to Sicily. > Gylippus was, however, still actively carrying out the campaign on land. > at the little town of Olympieum expressly to prevent plunder$5 ippus' supreme action, 'flocked He continued to build his counter-wall and constantly drew up the c Suracusans in front of the wall to threaten the Athenians. With the reinforcements he had brought the Syracusans now would have had a considerable superiority in hoplite numbers over the Athenians. Eventually, he offered battle to the Athenians in the confined space between the walls. In this restricted battlefield the Syracusan superiority in cavalry and light infantry was negated, as it had been at Anapus, and again the Athenians won the battle, setting up yet another trophy. According to the Athenian poet, Euripides, These men at Syracuse eight times were triumphant as victors; heroes they were while the gods favoured both causes alike." > Gylippus assembled the army and admitted that the defeat was due to his generalship and not to their courage. He attempted to raise their spirits by reminding them that they, being Dorians, werenaturally bravepthan the enemy, 'Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that accompanied them." In this appraisal of their Courage he proved correct, as despite their constant defeats at the hands of the Athenians the Syracusans had not lost heart and soon allowed themselves to be led out to battle once again. > The Syracusans had continued building their counter-wall and brought it to the point where it was almost across the Athenian wall on the Epipolae. If it succeeded, the Athenians would have no chance of effecting a land blockade of the city. As Thucydides claimed, the campaign would then be lost as 'if it went any further it would from that moment on make no difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or never fought at all." Nicias was now forced to once again lead the Athenians out to do battle tor control of the heights. > Gylippus this time led his army further out from the walls, into more open countryside where his cavalry and skirmishers would have room to operate effectively. Now having greater room to manoeuvre, the Syracusan cavairy managed to outflank and rout the left wing of the Athenians. With their flank exposed the whole Athenian army lost heart and was driven back by the Syracusan phalanx. It was the first major victory by the Syracusan hoplites over their Athenian opponents. - [n] Wars r1 in the hearts of men, not on the fields of battle. Winning awards defined by who is still fighting and the objectives achieves. This is why I love the war of 1812, everybody feels like they won. But it's an important lesson for modern Life too, America dominated the battlefields of vietnam, but we never achieved our objectives. same to with iraq. From political perspective there are so many generals who just want to have the ability to go in and smash everything and say that they've won, but in modern warfare the objectives of changed. America doesn't usually he wants to wipe out Iran, we're trying to change it, and change is one in the hearts of men, not on the fields of battle. Too many soldiers and too many generals don't understand that you can't make that kind of objective happen just with military night. You need propaganda, you need completely control, like how the Romans educated the high-ranking sons of their conquered tribes in order to romanize the empire. The Inca did something similar. and it's because of Syracuse teaches us, wars are won in the hearts of men, not on the fields of battle. (Page 103) ### Page 108 > Back in Syracuse, skirmishing continued in the harbour around where the Syracusans had built a palisade of stakes in the sea, so that their ships might ride at anchor in safety. The Athenians brought up a large merchant ship, which they had fortified with wooden towers and bulwarks to act as a strongpoint. From boats they tied ropes to the stakes and tore them up. They also sent divers to saw throughyhem from underwater. The Syracusans retaliated with a shower of missites from the shore which was returned by the men on the ship. Eventually, the Athenians succeeded in pulling up most of the palisade. This fighting dragged on for days, as the Syracusans replaced the stakes and the Athenians tried to stop them. > The Syracusans had learnt the lessons of their previous defeat and made mprovements to the construction of their vessels. They shortened and strengthened their prows, and made the beams which projected from them onger and thicker. These modifications were certainly copied from the Corinthians. The fleet they had earlier sent to the Peloponnesus in order to orotect the troop ships had been modified in the same way, The reasoning pehind these modifications was to negate the Athenian superiority in seamanhip. One of the main tactics of the Athenians was the diekplous, which nvolved using their superior skill to sail through the enemy line, turn quicker han their opponents and then ram them from the rear. This was by far the referred position for ramming, as triremes were quite fragile and ramming moving vessel from in front, or from the side, could result in the aggressor's row being damaged or even ripped completely off. The Corinthian theory ad turned this tactic on its head. - [n] It's cool to see the sort of creative military thinking. we could stand to take a lesson in thinking outside of the box from the Greeks. (Page 108) ### Page 112 > Despite his call for an immediate attack, Demosthenes began by ravaging the fields of the Syracusans south of the city, an operation designed to help the Athenians regain their confidence. The Syracusans no longer came out to oppose them at sea and on land they limited themselves to raids from the temple, Demosthenes began his assault on the counter-wall by bringing up siege engines, probably rams. The Syracusan defenders succeeded in burning these and defeating the accompanying attacks by the Athenian infantry. - [n] It's pretty interesting to see the unusual uses of temples the Greeks used. I can't imagine another society that would have used a temple or church as the base of the army. (Page 112) ### Page 120 > While these deliberations were going on in the Athenian camp the Syracusan commanders had problems of their own, although of a less dangerous kind. Gylippus and Hermocrates both feared that the Athenians would slip away that night and continue the war from another part of Sicily. > The Athenians still numbered about 40,000 men. They wished to send out the army to block the roads and passes but could not get anyone to obey their orders. Not surprisingly, virtually the entire population of the city 'in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking. .. and would probably consent to anything sooner than take their arms and march out at that moment." - [n] This is a great example of why discipline matters. Professional army will March even though there is booty and drunkenness to be had, but there are a few professional armies at this time. This is a good way to reference miles Cameron and other stories about mercenary captains like the black company. It's not the good mercenary companies who keep their men from pillaging have moral objections per se, although that's one reason that it's all the good guys doing it that way, it's the bad discipline in case you need to be ready to fight will get you killed, a mercenary captains are generally in the business of keeping their people alive so they can fight and make money another day, and they don't lose sight of that because they're professionals. Doing the job and not letting emotions get the better of you is the definition of professionalism after all. (Page 120) ### Page 135 > Ancient empires were firm believers in the concept of the pre-emptive strike. If another power threatened you, it was best to attack first. If successful you might destroy them, although a more likely result would be to conquer part of their territory. This would both weaken them and strengthen you. It would also ensure that their lands would suffer the inevitable destruction that would accompany any campaign. For all these reasons Sicily would now become the obvious target for Carthaginian conquest. (Page 135) ### None > The site of the new city was about eight kilometres to the west of the destroyed Himera but well to the east of previous Phoenician settlements. The easy victories over Selinus and Himera, plus the discord in Syracuse, may have convinced the Carthaginians of their military superiority over the Greeks. > They voted to send another large expedition to the island, again placing Hannibal in command. In a manner reminiscent of Nicias, he requested to be excused because of his age but the Carthaginians insisted. They did, however, appoint another general, Himilcon, a member of the same family, to share the burden of command. - [n] This is taking the idea that you should only give power to people who don't want it a little bit far. We often fail to examine that truism, but here's a good example of why it can be bad to do that. If you put somebody who is unmotivated and doesn't want to fight in charge of fighting force, they will wind up like Nicias I make decisions that are less effective because they're unwilling to be bold and take risks and be aggressive enough to win a war.